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The Covid-19 public health emergency has amplified corruption globally not least
across the pharmaceutical industry, within governments’ ‘VIP lanes’ for Covid-19
suppliers,  and  further  down  to  individuals’  access  to  vaccination,  tests  and
healthcare (Mucchielli 2020; Teremetskyi et al. 2021). To corruption, Romania is
neither an exception nor a newcomer. However, while levels of corruption might
have increased in the short term in Romania, Adriana Mihaela Soaita argues that
the accelerated institutional digitalization prompted by the pandemic will restrain
corruption in the longer term. Her argument draws on a longitudinal-qualitative
case  study,  which  finds  e-governance  to  be  a  socially  trusted  anticorruption
mechanism, besides being a welcomed institutional reform.
Introduction
It is striking that a great majority of Europeans believe corruption is widespread
in their countries (i.e. “happening in many places and/or among many people”,
Cambridge Dictionary), yet few have experienced it. In the least corrupt European
Union (EU) member states of Denmark, Finland, and Sweden, between 20% and
44% of people thought corruption was widespread; in Slovenia and Italy, over
90% believed the same, but fewer than 3% in all the aforementioned countries
actually indicated they had paid or were expected to pay a bribe in the last year
(EC 2014, data from 2013). In Romania, the respective figures are 93% (for belief)
and 25% (for experience). The difference between perceptions and experiences is
puzzling and indicates that people’s meanings of  corruption should be better
understood.
Designing anticorruption policies that are trusted by citizens has possibly never
been more important given increasing EU fiscal integration and the €1.8 trillion
post-COVID  stimulus  package.  Moreover,  the  EU  has  engaged  in  fighting
corruption above and across its member states,  having opened the European
Public Prosecutor’s Office in September 2020, led by the Romanian prosecutor
Laura Codruța Kövesi. Within the EU, the post-communist states show higher
than  average  levels  of  corruption,  commonly  seen  as  a  lingering  communist
legacy and/or  defective  institutionalization (Mungiu-Pippidi  2005;  Rose 2009),
although  some  countries,  particularly  Estonia,  have  achieved  spectacular
progress in controlling corruption, including through an advanced e-governance
regime (Kasemets 2012).
Post-communist  Romania  took  a  slower  and  twisting  path.  Since  2012,  a
remarkable high-level anticorruption drive has taken place, with Kövesi at its
center. Over 2,000 high-ranking public executives have been convicted, including
one  Prime  Minister,  21  Members  of  Parliament  (MPs)  and  30  judges;  but
misappropriated funds have been rarely recovered.  Recent parliamentary attacks
on the independence of the judiciary were fought through street protests, leading
to the 2019 ‘Justice’ referendum, which showed Romanians endorse the fight
against corruption. There are, however, limits to such a judiciary approach. If
fully applied, in any one year about a quarter of Romanians (in similar numbers to
Poles and Hungarians) would be jailed for giving and most medical  stuff  for
receiving (Manea 2014) a medical bribe, with national health services collapsing
due to a  lack of staff. Other notable measures to constrain corruption in Romania
included raising public pay and public awareness. Overall, Romania’s judiciary
and anticorruption performance is still monitored through the EU Cooperation
and Verification Mechanism, showing that progress has been partial.
Given  EU’s  and  Romania’s  anticorruption  agenda,  the  Regional  Studies
Association gave me the opportunity to explore the (dis)trust¾(anti)corruption
nexus through a qualitative-longitudinal study by revisiting the Romanian city of
Pitesti (Figure 1), where I had first examined these themes in 2008.
While analysis of the rich data collected is ongoing, in this article I wish to posit
digitalization as a socially trusted anti-corruption mechanism. Finding socially
trusted mechanisms to address social ills or dilemmas is important, particularly in
a  context  of  distrust  in  the  institutions  that  oversee  the  rule  of  law  and
administrative impartiality.
Mapping the (dis)trust-(anti)corruption nexus
The academic literature about trust looms so largely (Figure 2) that we need a
theoretically  refined synthesis  against  which  to  position  empirical  work.  The
literature delves into detailed rational-choice accounts and game theory, and at
times  into  finely-grained  analyses  of  relational  practices,  inspiring  historical
analyses or philosophical work. Trust is understood as, some or all of, historic
culture, institutions, norms, rational practices, and personal leaps of faith. This
scholarship validates our intuitions that inscribed, institutional or social trust is
hard to win, easy to lose, develops along continua (from complete distrust to blind
trust,  but  mostly  in  between),  is  never  a  zero-sum game,  and  is  differently
distributed across societies and social groups. There is general agreement that
social and institutional trust facilitates better economic performance, healthier
democracy, and higher citizens’ wellbeing. Most post-communist countries still
show low levels of trust and higher levels of distrust than established democracies
(Soaita and Wind, 2021). In 2011, Romania showed one of the lowest levels of
trust globally.
Figure 2. Mapping the trust and corruption ‘literature’ (yearly no. of
publications, shown from 2000)
Searched in SCOPUS on 19 May 2021 in titles, abstracts, and keywords for the
words: Trust (TR): 68,343 publications; timeline 1889-2021; of these, 15% are
qualitative studies. Corruption (CO): 20,737 publications; timeline 1892-2021; of
these, 9% are qualitative studies. Results restricted to articles, books and book
chapters and to the disciplines of Arts and Humanities; Business, Management
and Accounting; Economics; Psychology; Social Sciences. Source: the author.
The corruption scholarship is about two-thirds smaller than works on trust. It
glides  through  narrow,  legal  definitions  and  occasionally  through  broader,
nuanced understandings of what we deem to be (un)ethical across the domains of
the  economic,  the  cultural  and  the  political  (Ackerman  and  Palifka  2016).
Analyses  centre  on  the  public  domain,  often  calling  for  the  ‘small  state,’
notwithstanding the fact that controlling corruption requires public and private
institutions (e.g., an independent judiciary, media, NGOs), and that corruption
independently occurs in the private domain (Burduja and Zaharia 2019). The big
difference between perceptions and
experiences  of  corruption  remains  poorly  explained,  its  complex  foundations
(between the legal and the ethical, the factual and the perceptual, the trusted and
the distrusted, the citizenry and the elite) being overlooked (except e.g., Rose-
Ackerman and Palifka  2016).  Various  practices  of  corruption (e.g.,  nepotism,
favouritism,  cronyism,  personal  connections,  gift,  bribery,  sextortion,  undue
influence, extortion, fraud, kickbacks) are summoned into one definition, e.g.,
“abuse  of  entrusted  power  for  private  gains”  (transparencyinternational.org).
Some forms  of  corruption  could  be  thought  of  as  social  dilemmas:  if  every
contractor  or  patient  would  stop  paying  a  kickback  or  a  medical  bribe,  all
businesses and patients would be better off (but public remunerations may need
to increase).
Surprisingly, trust and corruption analyses barely explicitly overlap. The yellow
line in Figure 2 is hardly visible (n=871, timeline 1990-2021; 10% qualitative
studies; 4 publications on Romania). The geopolitical area of (post)communism is
under-represented (8% and 12% for trust and corruption respectively) but has
grown  since  2010,  and  empirically  qualitative  accounts  are  rare.  These
observations show that exploring the (dis)trust-(anti)corruption nexus through a
rich longitudinal-qualitative study sits within important literature gaps.
The data
The Covid-19 pandemic  disrupted my planned fieldwork,  accommodation and
flights having been already booked. Nonetheless, with the help of a local assistant
and  remote  interviewing,  I  achieved  my  desired  longitudinal  sample  and
interviewed 16 participants out of the 69 who participated in my early research
back in 2008 (aged 48-85 in 2020). This was enhanced with a small subset of
eight younger, new participants (aged 23-38; recruited through the Facebook
group ‘Pitesti, orasul meu’). Recorded ZOOM interviews were conducted during
May-Sep 2020;  they were unusually  long,  lasting on average two hours  (the
longest  four  hours  and  a  half).  The  interview  focused  on  trust  (e.g.,
trusted/distrusted  institutions/persons;  social  and  institutional  trust;  trends),
corruption (gifts vs bribes; tax evasion vs corruption; nepotism/favouritism; top-
corruption;  trends);  and  anticorruption  measures,  with  participant  examples
discussed first, followed by researcher structured probes.
Legality and morality in the corruption repertoire
The fact that participants discussed many but barely any COVID-related examples
is telling rather than surprising. It tells that Romania is far from the newcomer to
corruption stories and perhaps also that “saving lives justifies speed beyond and
above the worry for corruption” (r19/male/aged-48). Indeed, 53% of Romanians
believed in 2020 that “it is acceptable for the government to engage in a bit of
corruption as long as it gets things done and delivers good results” (TI 2021).
Some participants in my study believed the same but many were aghast by this
way of thinking:
I often heard people saying, “He did steal, but he got things done, right?” I pay
attention to people’s reactions when it comes to corruption, and everyone reacts
alike, which means it’s a collective mindset. Or, in a slightly different form, as one
shocked me by asking me “if YOU had the jar of honey in front of you, wouldn’t
you lick your fingers?” Yes, that is the sad mentality at the moment. People
actually legitimize theft because the culprit had delivered something, had not
stolen everything. Or because, even when convicted by Court, they remain with
the stolen money (r13/male/aged-38).
Participants’ examples of practices of corruption were those from their everyday
lives, such as medical bribes; a badly constructed bridge, road or school; the
‘good-and-bad detective’ plot played by (fiscal, police, health) agents of control;
jobs accessed through ‘nepotism’ or enormous bribes (priests, surgeons, lawyers,
managers in multinationals, drivers). Other examples were brought home by the
media,  referring  to  many  convicted  names  or  dealings  of  public  resonance.
Corruption is so ubiquitous in the public discourse and its emotional load so
intense, that some participants preferred to take a step away for their own sanity:
I watch very little news, but I get informed from discussions with mom and
colleagues. But I, personally, I am not very interested in these things. I don’t
know if it’s necessarily a good way to be disinterested, but it makes me so
nervous because I hear nothing but nasty things, only corruption, what this one
did, what that one did. It is just makes me so angry hearing about those deals
(r10/male/aged-35).
By discussing the above and other examples, it became clear there were fluid
tensions between legal  and ethical  understandings of  corruption.  On the one
hand, laws were presented as being (re)made by a highly untrusted political class,
to their own advantage. Indeed, in 2021 Romania showed the lowest level of trust
in  the  government  (20% of  the  population)  and the  highest  share  of  people
believing that the Parliament, national government, and the Prime Minister are all
corrupt, i.e.: 51%, 40% and 37% of people, respectively, almost twice the EU
average (TI 2021).
On  the  other  hand,  the  moral  repertoire  of  corruption,  as  conferred  by
participants, looms large from givers’ pragmatism, despondency or gratitude, to
takers’ sense of deservingness, greed or shamelessness, and further to win-win,
supply-demand  arrangements.  For  instance,  “Maria”  (r20/female/aged-25)
purposefully  argued  for  the  legal  understanding  of  corruption  as  ”taking  a
personal advantage of a privately or publicly position by illegal means”. However
she  and  other  young  participants  decried  widespread  practices  of
‘nepotism’/‘favouritism’/’personal  connections’  in  accessing  the  public/private
labour market against which no legal framework exists (except for few positions
necessitating open competition, themselves abused).
Likewise, most participants considered that small ‘gifts’/’attentions’ are socially
acceptable  despite  legal  prescriptions  criminalizing  givers  and  receivers
irrespective of the value of the bribe. Participants emphasized that offering a gift
(when they want and not necessarily in exchange for an immediate service) is
socially accepted for personalizing the relationship,  equalizing the balance of
power, expressing one’s social  position or just because ”we are kind people”
(quote across interviews). The interview question on what makes the difference
between a gift and a bribe showed that boundaries are hard to define (value,
timing,  and  sentiment)  and  depend  on  one’s  subjectivity  and  socioeconomic
position.
Interestingly, with the exception of a few participants owning small businesses,
most others saw no difference between corruption and tax evasion/avoidance
since both are ”thefts of public money” (quote across interviews), paid or dodged.
They are also interlinked. There was vivid preoccupation regarding which one
was more ‘immoral’, or whom should make the first move towards a less corrupt
society. This ‘chicken versus egg” argument frames many social dilemmas and, I
argue, it  should be deconstructed by anti-corruption policies that equally and
concomitantly tackle both. Similarly, certain forms of fraud e.g., industry ‘market’
practices,  revolving doors (the public/private health system),  a  bonus culture
(including special pensions for the political/judiciary elite) and inequality in front
of the law  entered the corruption discourse. Rothstein’s (2011) argument that we
mobilise different moral rules across different social domains (family, market,
public institutions) did not neatly apply, e.g., market greed was sanctioned as
corruption rather than approved, reflecting a society that has experienced ”the
wild capitalism of transition” (r10/male/aged-35).
I  would  like  to  emphasize  that,  at  times  with  evident  distress,  participants
resented the fact that Romania is stigmatized internationally as a corruption hot
spot:
Everyone asks us about corruption, but corruption was invented by those ‘clever’
boys of Germany, France, England, by them. I suggest you ask them, in England,
see what do they say? They are ‘clever’ boys, they made corruption legal for them,
and made ‘criteria’ for us, want us to have ‘transparency’. Do they have
transparency in England? They steal billions of pounds in legal corruption, and we
are singled out for stealing millions of lei. This hypocrisy makes me very angry
(r19/male/aged-48).
Recent opinion data (TI 2021) seem to support this view in terms of tax avoidance
and governments being run by private interests, explaining some of the puzzles of
the big differences between perceptions and experiences of corruption. As I have
lived in the UK for some time, I have indeed noticed that Romanians’ predilection
to class a whole range of social practices as corruption is equally matched by a
British reticence of applying the concept to any of their own.
Fighting corruption
Understanding how such cultural/structural, legal/moral complexities play out in
the flamboyant corruption’s  public/private repertoire is  important  in  order to
understand  how corruption  can  be  fought  in  a  socially  acceptable  way.  No
participant contested the legitimacy of fighting corruption as ”you change chaos
into  normality”  (r11/female/aged-52);  ”we  will  all  be  richer,  materially  and
emotionally,  we would be unsoiled, not anymore scared by our own shadow”
(r17/female/aged-85); ”there would be trust between the doctor and the patient,
the  citizen  and  the  administration”  (r2/male/aged-59).  However,  given
corruption’s  recognized normalization and in-built  social  dilemmas,  not  many
participants believed it could ever be eliminated; at best reduced by ”building a
self-cleaning system” (r13/male/aged-38).
All participants endorsed the judicial approach, undaunted by narratives of the
whole (health) service collapsing as a result and that was because they believed in
its preventative power, if applied fully (recovering misappropriated funds; firmer
sentences) and in a non-politicized manner. Criticism, of which there was plenty,
was not against but for a stronger judiciary approach, for which some participants
had taken to the streets in 2018. Participants mentioned other ways of reducing
corruption, such as civic education (n=6), marketization (n=2), the ‘small state’
(n=1)  and  professionalization  (n=1),  before  being  prompted  to  discuss  the
efficacy of my own suggestions, some inspired from the corruption literature,
others from policy developments in  Romania.  The former included pay rises,
institutional digitalization, transparent procurement and the judiciary approach
(see e.g. Manea, 2004; Mungiu-Pippidi 2005; Rothstein 2011), the latter referred
to CCTV, anticorruption posters and street protest.
Commonly,  participants  were  surprised  by  casting  digitalization  as  an  anti-
corruption  strategy  (except  two  who  discussed  it  unprompted)  while
wholeheartedly  admitting  its  potential:
I never thought of digitalization from this perspective, but just as a timely
administrative reform. But digitalization reduces human contact, hence the
possibilities to demand or offer bribes, it is just you and a robot, it leaves a hard
trail behind (r20/female/aged-25).
The Covid-19 accelerated digitalization was observed and approved:
Public institutions should develop digital platforms and the truth is the pandemic
has super-accelerated it. Education moved online, teachers and children and
parents had to learn it. The Pension Department moved online, the Court moved
online, prescriptions moved online. If you digitalize, there are no longer
opportunities to bribe, to cook the book. You fill in a form, say what you want,
attach documents, it’s there, can’t be changed, it’s transparent (r2/male/aged-60).
Trust  in  digitalization  and  other  ICT  technologies  (CCTV,  bank  cards)  as
anticorruption  mechanisms  was  high  but  not  blind.  Three  participants  saw
digitalization  as  effective  in  reducing  small  but  not  necessarily  top-level
corruption,  with  the  latter  becoming  more  imaginative  and  sophisticated  (a
shared view among participants). One thought that effects needed time to filter
down whilst digitalization progresses; another observed the important need to
monitor  the  digital  space  (a  ‘second-order’  dilemma  in  managing  trust  and
corruption).
While I asked about institutional digitalization, participants also brought to the
fore the anti-corruption potential of the technological/digital society:
Technology has changed everything; people in their 60s, elderly in their 70s,
walk-and-talk on their mobiles, watching Facebook when crossing the street
(r14/male/aged-49).
The Internet changed everything. People now film and their videos become viral. I
saw many cases, people filming how doctors demand bribes, how horribly they
were treated. And it matters as those feel shamed or scared to lose their job
(r23/female/aged-29).
The issue of digital exclusion remains pertinent¾ more so in rural places and for
certain  social  categories¾despite  intergenerational  mediation,  even
transnationally, as also substantiated by Iossifova (2020) for the case of Bulgaria’s
elderly:
Ha, ha we had to submit the paperwork to the Town Hall, for this new system of
billing; by electronic post or by internet or what-you-call-it, and it was my
daughter from Luxembourg who did it for me: Luxembourg-Pitesti, ha, ha
(r17/female/aged-85)
My fieldwork took place before the implementation of the Covid-19 vaccination
programme (led by the most trusted Romanian institution, the Army), including
through  a  national  digital  platform.  Prioritized,  the  elderly  could  arrange
appointments by phone or through their Family Doctor, but there is anecdotal
evidence not only that the family/social  network stepped in to digitally make
appointments  but  also  that  the digital  platform was the preferred and more
trusted  option  (later,  with  both  increased  vaccine  supply  and  inoculation
hesitancy,  the  platform  lost  its  vital  importance).
None  of  the  anti-corruption  methods  discussed,  from  the  symbolism  of
anticorruption  posters  to  digitalization  and  further  on  to  a  firmer  judiciary
approach,  were  seen  as  a  panacea  by  themselves,  but  most  effective  in
combination. Participants used metaphors such as Hydra, octopus, Mafia, spider
webs, blood spoiling the water, and the iceberg to describe the crisscrossing of
diverse practices of small/top-level, private/public corruption. Nonetheless, even
the most critical agreed that the situation had (slightly, barely) improved since
2008, particularly at  the level  of  the everyday.  Indeed,  levels of  experienced
bribery fell from 25% to 20% over the decade to 2020. The public corruption
index (Figure 3) shows significant improvement since 2000, with the EU post-
communist  countries  closing  the  gap  between  them  and  the  Mediterranean
countries. Romania’s performance improved from values in the 20s in the first
half of the 2000s, to values in the 30s in the second half of the same decade,
farther on to values in the 40s in the 2010s. Nonetheless, Romania presented the
poorest performance in the EU between 2000 and 2007, and shared the bottom
four poorest performances after that (with Bulgaria, Greece, occasionally Italy
and Hungary).
Figure 3. The public corruption index (transparency.org)
Source:  By the author based on public data from https://transparency.org/en/
Highest values (max 100) show less(no) corruption.
A closing word on geography
In  2008,  my  participants  cast  geography  (rural/urban  and  regional)  and
generations as axes of difference in relation to attitudes to and practices of trust,
social capital and corruption, although World Values Survey data showed this was
only partially true (Soaita and Wind 2021). By 2020, participants had stopped
believing in generational differences, but geographical variation was still flagged:
In Pitesti things are changing for the better and this is the position I am talking
from: I don’t live in a village to depend on the Mayor for wood, pension, taxes, I
don’t know how people live there. I speak as a resident of a quite important and
successful city (01/male/aged-41)
Things are different from city to city, from village to village, there are different
models of cities, some with more trust and less corruption, others with less trust
and more corruption. Trust and corruption can be very local matters
(r3/female/aged-24)
The above reminds us that openness to digitalization must be seen as an urban
phenomenon, villages being more likely places of digital exclusion. Furthermore,
with other cities, including the capital of Bucharest, Pitesti has topped national
news with large corruption scandals such as the fraudulent issuing of driving
licenses at an international scale; a five-mandate Mayor sentenced to prison; a
€400,000  public  toilet.  While  more  optimistic  views  may  thus  come  from
elsewhere, the hopeful trend taking place in such a corruption-stained city as
Pitesti is even more telling of the positive changes occurring in Romania. Overall,
with forthcoming EU funds being considered as corruption-proof, I agree with
Neild  (2002)  that  public  outcry  about  corruption  practices  and  scandals,  as
participants  have  so  eloquently  discussed,  a  signal  that  positive  change  is
underway, even if only “because there is nothing left to steal” (r18/male/aged-50).
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